From Benicia Mayor Elizabeth Patterson’s E-ALERT
[See also: KQED NEWS, California Report.]
Sent: Thursday, August 9, 2018 9:32 AM
Subject: State Decides Not to Penalize PG&E for Major Valero Outage
My full statement to KQED was:
Without an Industrial Safety Ordinance residents and workers in Benicia are at risk because the CPUC cravenly fails to ensure that PG&E provide adequate training when working on power supply to Valero Refinery. Without an Industrial Safety Ordinance Benicia has no way to check on the adequacy and timeliness of PG&E training.
On top of that the city cannot require Valero to “power down” when major work is being done by PG&E. The CPUC fails to consider the public – the City of Benicia and its school district are the only public entities in the near catastrophic May 5th PG&E power outage at Valero Refinery. The Public Utilities Commission fails to consider the city in its investigation. There was no effort to determine the costs to the city for opening and operating the Emergency Center; no cost for deploying our police and fire personnel; no cost for all staff on deck for the entire episode; no cost for the loss of public trust . No effort to determine the costs to the BUSD for shelter in place. No effort to determine the cost to loss of business in the Benicia Industrial Park. Without the ISO the City of Benicia could not present this information to the CPUC. Sleeping on the “Public” of the CA Public Utilities Commission does not extinguish the need for Californians’ access to safe and reliable utility infrastructure and services.
- Mission Statement: The CPUC regulates services and utilities, protects consumers, safeguards the environment, and assures Californians’ access to safe and reliable utility infrastructure and services.
CPUC Investigation Conclusion:
- My [CPUC] investigation found that PG&E violated General Order 174, Rule 12 because: 1) PG&E failed to maintain the CCTV for its intended use and also2) PG&E failed to provide adequate training, documents, or diagrams for its operators to identify the CCVT as part of the anti-islanding protection scheme since the documents, diagrams, and training on the protection scheme did not provide enough clarity on the activation conditions and how they relate to the failed CCVT.