‘Weak safety culture’ faulted in fatal Quebec train derailment, fire
By Curtis Tate, McClatchy Washington Bureau, August 19, 2014
Aerial view of charred freight train in Lac-Megantic in Quebec, Canada. | TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA
CHICAGO — Canadian safety investigators on Tuesday blamed a “weak safety culture” and inadequate government oversight for a crude oil train derailment last year in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, that killed 47 people.
In its nearly 200-page report, issued more than 13 months after the deadly crash, Canada’s Transportation Safety Board identified 18 contributing factors.
“Take any one of them out of the equation,” said Wendy Tadros, the board’s chairman, “and the accident may not have happened.”
Among other factors, the investigation found that the train’s sole engineer failed to apply a sufficient number of handbrakes after parking the train on a descending grade several miles from Lac-Megantic, and leaving it unattended for the night.
The engineer applied handbrakes to the train’s five locomotives and two other cars, but investigators concluded that he did not set handbrakes on any of the train’s 72 tank cars loaded with 2 million gallons of Bakken crude oil.
Investigators said the engineer should have set at least 17 handbrakes. Instead, he relied on another braking system in the lead locomotive to hold the train in place. But after local residents reported a fire on the locomotive later that night, firefighters shut the locomotive off, following instructions given by another railroad employee.
Not long after, the train began its runaway descent, reaching a top speed of 65 mph. The train derailed in the center of Lac-Megantic at a point where the maximum allowable speed was 15 mph.
Investigators said that the derailment caused 59 of the 63 tank cars that derailed to puncture, releasing 1.6 million gallons of flammable crude oil into the town, much of which burned. In addition to the 47 fatalities, 2,000 people were evacuated, and 40 buildings and 53 vehicles were destroyed.
The train’s engineer and two other railroad employees are set to go on trial next month. But Tadros noted that the investigation revealed “more than handbrakes, or what the engineer did or didn’t do.”
“Experience has taught us that even the most well-trained and motivated employees make mistakes,” she said.
The Quebec derailment set in motion regulatory changes on both sides of the border to improve the safety of trains carrying crude oil. Sixteen major derailments involving either crude oil or ethanol have occurred since 2006, according to the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board.
Tadros said the railroad relied on its employees to follow the rules and that regulators relied on the railroads to enforce their own rules. But she said that a complex system requires more attention to safety.
“It’s not enough for a company to have a safety management system on paper,” she said. “It has to work.”
Report Reveals Cost Cutting Measures At Heart Of Lac-Megantic Oil Train Disaster
2014-08-19, by Justin Mikulka
Today the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released its final report on the July 6th, 2013 train derailment in Lac-Megantic, Quebec. The report produced a strong reaction from Keith Stewart, Greenpeace Canada’s Climate and Energy Campaign coordinator.
“This report is a searing indictment of Transport Canada’s failure to protect the public from a company that they knew was cutting corners on safety despite the fact that it was carrying increasing amounts of hazardous cargo. This lax approach to safety has allowed the unsafe transport of oil by rail to continue to grow even after the Lac Megantic disaster. It is time for the federal government to finally put community safety ahead of oil and rail company profits or we will see more tragedies, Stewart said.”
Throughout the report there is ample evidence to support Stewart’s position and plenty to show why the people of Lac-Megantic want the CEO of Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA), the rail company responsible for the accident, held accountable in place of the engineer and other low level employees currently facing charges.
At the press conference for the release of the report the TSB representatives often noted that they had found 18 factors that contributed to the actual crash and they were not willing to assign blame to anyone, claiming that wasn’t their role.
But several critical factors stand out and they are the result of MMA putting profits ahead of safety and Transport Canada (TC), the Canadian regulators responsible for overseeing rail safety, failing to do its job.
Engine Fire
The issue that set the whole chain of events into motion on July 6th was an engine fire in the unattended locomotive. As usual the engineer had left the train unattended with one locomotive running while shutting off the others. This locomotive supplied power to the air braking system. The locomotive caught on fire, the fire department was called and they put out the fire and shut off the locomotive in the process.
Today’s TSB report notes that the fire was due to an improper repair of a cam bearing. Instead of doing a costly replacement, the cam bearing was repaired with epoxy (polymeric material). As the report states:
This temporary repair had been performed using a polymeric material, which did not have the strength and durability required for this use.
Braking Failure
Once the locomotive was shut down due to the fire, it could no longer power the air brake system.
As previously reported on DeSmogBlog, this type of system has been described as “19th century technology” by a rail safety expert at the Federal Railroad Administration but as a whole the rail industry has not upgraded to newer technologies because of the costs involved.
Without power to the air braking system, the braking system lost pressure over time and the train began to roll towards Lac-Megantic.
This wouldn’t have been an issue if the proper number of handbrakes had been applied. But the engineer had not applied enough handbrakes because he had not performed the hand brake effectiveness test properly and had left the locomotive air brakes on while conducting the test. The report notes the lack of training and oversight for that particular locomotive engineer (LE).
Furthermore, the LE was never tested on the procedures for performing a hand brake effectiveness test, nor did the company’s Operational Tests and Inspections (OTIS) Program confirm that hand brake effectiveness tests were being conducted correctly.
The report also notes that when MMA employees were tested for safety knowledge, they could take the tests home.
Requalification typically consisted of 1 day to complete the exam, and did not always involve classroom training. On many occasions, employees would take the exam home for completion.
However, in this case, there were not even questions on the test on this critical subject.
They did not have questions on the hand brake effectiveness test, the conditions requiring application of more than the minimum number of hand brakes, nor the stipulation that air brakes cannot be relied upon to prevent an undesired movement.
And they found this had been the situation since before the oil trains starting running.
Since 2009, no employee had been tested on CROR 112(b), which targeted the hand brake effectiveness test. In 2012, U.S. employees had been tested twice on that rule; both tests had resulted in a “Failure”.
Single Operator Risks
The report goes into detail about how MMA came to be operating oil trains with only one crew member. And while ultimately the regulators failed, some did raise flags about this. When MMA initially sought to move to single person train operations (SPTO) from the standard two person crew, it was noted that there were significant issues with their operations.
In July 2009, TC expressed a number of concerns that centred on deficiencies in MMA operations, including lack of consultation with employees in doing risk assessments, problems managing equipment, problems with remote-control operations, issues with rules compliance, issues with fatigue management, and a lack of investment in infrastructure maintenance.
Additionally the report notes that Transport Canada’s Quebec office expressed specific concerns in 2010.
TC Quebec Region reiterated its concern about MMA’s suitability as an SPTO candidate.
And yet despite the concerns and MMA’s poor track record, in 2012 they were allowed to start running single crew trains despite TC Quebec still expressing concern.
In February 2012, TC met with MMA and the RAC. TC advised MMA that TC did not approve SPTO. MMA only needed to comply with all applicable rules and regulations. TC Quebec Region remained concerned about the safety of SPTO on MMA.
Unsurprisingly, the additional training for employees who would be operating trains on their own was almost non-existent. And it was focused on the fact that for safety purposes, engineers were allowed to stop the trains and take naps.
The actual SPTO training for several LEs, including the accident LE, consisted of a short briefing in a manager’s office on the need to report to the RTC every 30 minutes, on the allowance for power naps, and on the need to bring the train to a stop to write clearances.
This report is a clear indictment of a system that allows for corporate profit over public safety. However, what also is clear from today’s press conference and from the regulatory situation in the United States is that nothing of significance has changed regarding the movement of oil by rail in the US and Canada.
A poorly maintained locomotive can still be left running and unattended. There still is no formal regulation on how many hand brakes need to be applied to secure a train.
Single person crews are still allowed and Burlington Northern Santa Fe, the company moving the most oil-by-rail in the U.S., is working to implement this as a practice despite the objections of the employees.
In short, the corporate profit before public safety approach is still standard operating procedure. And the oil trains are expected to return to the tracks through Lac-Megantic within a year.
Train tracks where the ill-fated train was parked. (c) Justin Mikulka.
Image Credit: Transportation Safety Board via flickr.
Repost from The Financial Post, Toronto [NOTE: THIS POSTING OUT OF DATE, BUT THE ISSUES REMAIN SIGNIFICANT FOR US ALL! …FROM JUNE, 2013]
[Editor’s note: Here in Benicia, Valero is repeatedly using a scare tactic as one of its primary talking points. When Valero says that their Crude By Rail project will “ensure the refinery remains a strong and healthy member of the community” (quoting from Valero’s mailer), it plainly IMPLIES that without this project, Valero may NOT remain strong and healthy, nor a member of the community. Valero has in this way frightened their own employees about their job security, and they hope to scare the rest of Benicia about the possibility of a sell-off or closure, harming the local tax base and economy. A few fearful and disorderly refinery employees and/or supporters have made verbal threats and ruined SafeBenicia signs, but opponents of the project don’t scare that easily. A transition away from fossil fuels will be fought with money, fear and every form of propaganda. Don’t listen. Solidarity with the workers is fine, but don’t buy into the threats that feed their fear and fury.
The following article on “Atlantic Basin” refineries details 15 closures, 1 sale and 5 “saved” refineries over the last 5 years. Four of the closures were U.S. refineries, one in Canada. These closures and retrofits will be a growing phenomenon as we transition out of fossil fuels as a primary energy source. It will be tough on us all, but good for life on Earth. – RS]
Shut down, saved or sold: The Atlantic Basin refineries
Selam Gebrekidan, Reuters | June 21, 2013
Imperial Oil Dartmouth Refinery, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. | Imperial Oil Limited
Imperial Oil Ltd said earlier this week it was unable to find a buyer for its refinery in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, and will instead convert the facility into a terminal operation.
The refinery, which employs some 400 staff and contractors, is Imperial’s least-profitable operation, as it uses high-priced imported crude oil. The company’s other three refineries process cheaper Canadian crude.
Imperial, controlled by Exxon Mobil Corp, put the refinery up for sale more than a year ago and has had interested parties but was not able to make a deal.
The refinery, the only one in Nova Scotia, is among several on both sides of the Atlantic that operators have put up for sale, shut down, or threatened to close due to poor economics.
Below is a list of these refineries.
SHUT REFINERIES:
DARTMOUTH, NOVA SCOTIA, CANADA Owner: Imperial Oil Ltd Capacity: 88,000 BPD
Imperial said in June 2013 it was unable to find a buyer for its Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, refinery after putting it up on sale more than a year ago, and will instead convert the facility into a terminal operation. The refinery is Imperial’s least-profitable operation as it uses high-priced imported crude oil. Imperial is controlled by Exxon Mobil Corp.
PORT READING, NEW JERSEY, USA Owner: Hess Corp Capacity: 70,000 BPD
Hess shut down its Port Reading refinery at the end of February, 2013, the second such facility the company was forced to shutter over the last year, marking the company’s exit from the refining and terminal business.
ARUBA REFINERY, ARUBA Owner: Valero Energy Corp Capacity: 235,000 BPD
Valero decided to convert the refinery into a crude oil and refined products terminal in September 2012 after failing to find a buyer for the plant.
The refinery had been idled since March 2012 due to weak profit margins since it processes heavy sour crudes it bought at a higher cost. Chinese oil giant PetroChina was said to be among strong bidders for the refinery.
ST. CROIX, U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS Owner: Hovensa LLC, a joint-venture between Hess Corp and state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela Capacity: 350,000 BPD
Hovensa first reduced rates from 500,000 bpd and then shut the refinery in February 2012. The government of the U.S. Virgin Island objected to the shutdown and in April 2013 said it had agreed to a 14-month sales process with Hovensa LLC, during which time the company could use the plant as a terminal.
The refinery had been powered by fuel oil rather than cheap natural gas because its isolation in the Caribbean mean gas imports are not available. That fact contributed to Hovensa making a loss of $1.3 billion in the last three years of its operation and any future owner will have the same problem to contend with.
MARCUS HOOK, PENNSYLVANIA, USA Owner: Sunoco Inc, part of Energy Transfer Partners LP, Sunoco Logistics Partners LP, which is part owned by Energy Transfer Partners. Capacity: 178,000 BPD
Sunoco shut the refinery in Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania, in December 2011, due to excess capacity and poor margins. Sunoco Logistics then bought the refinery in April 2013 for $60 million and plans to turn it into a natural gas liquids hubs to take advantage of the nearby Marcellus and Utica shale plays.
The company received no offers for the plant as a refinery. Sunoco is processing natural gas at the plant.
YORKTOWN, VIRGINIA, USA Owner: Western Refining Capacity: 66,300 BPD
Western Refining shut the refinery in September 2010 because of poor refining margins. The site was subsequently sold to Plains All American in December 2011 and is currently in use as a terminal.
EAGLE POINT, NEW JERSEY Owner: Sunoco Inc, part of Energy Transfer Partners LP. Capacity:145,000 BPD
Sunoco shut the Eagle Point refinery in November 2009, the first of the casualties of weak demand and slim profit margins among Atlantic Basin refineries. The site, which is connected under the Delaware River to Sunoco’s other sites, Philadelphia and Marcus Hook (see above), is a terminal with capacity to receive barges of Bakken crude from Albany.
BERRE, FRANCE Owner: LyondellBasell Capacity: 105,000 BPD
In January 2012, LyondellBasell mothballed the refinery in southeastern France having been unable to find a buyer for the plant since it began a sales process in May 2011.
Anne-Christine Poujoulat/AFP/Getty ImagesAn employee of US chemical group LyondellBasell waves a French flag as the employees gather during a new general meeting to protest against the closing of their plant in Berre l’Etang, southern France, on September 29, 2011.
CORYTON, ESSEX, UNITED KINGDOM Owner: Petroplus Capacity: 175,000 bpd
A joint-venture of UK Ltd, Vopak and Greenergy bought the refinery from Petroplus and converted it into a terminal in June, 2012. The refinery had stopped processing crude in May last year after its estimated $1 billion price tag failed to attract buyers.
Matthew Lloyd/BloombergThe Petroplus refinery in Coryton, Essex.
TEESSIDE, UNITED KINGDOM Owner: Petroplus Capacity: 117,000 bpd
Petroplus idled the plant in April 2009.
PETIT-COURONNE REFINERY, NORMANDY, FRANCE Owner: PetroPlus Capacity: 161,000 bpd
Petroplus announced in April 2013 that it will shut the refinery after bids to buy it were rejected as unfeasible by the plant’s administrator.
REICHSTETT, FRANCE Owner: Petroplus Capacity: 85,000 bpd
Petroplus closed the refinery in eastern France in the second quarter of 2011. The least profitable of the plants in the PetroPlus refinery stable, the refinery was converted to become a terminal.
DUNKIRK, FRANCE Owner: Total SA Capacity: 150,000 BPD
A French court authorized oil major Total to permanently close the refinery in late October 2010 and proceed with plans to develop non-refining activities on the site.
WILHELMSHAVEN, GERMANY Owner: ConocoPhillips
Capacity: 260,000 bpd
ConocoPhillips put the simple, hydroskimming refinery up for sale in July 2010. It was bought a year later by private Dutch company Hestya. It is currently being used as a terminal.
CREMONA, ITALY Owner: Tamoil Capacity: 90,000 bpd
Libya’s Tamoil shut the Italian refinery at the end of March 2011 and said it would pursue plans to convert the plant to a storage site.
REFINERIES FOR SALE:
MILFORD HAVEN, UNITED KINGDOM Owner: Murphy Oil Capacity: 130,000 BPD
U.S. oil firm Murphy Oil Corp said it would sell the plant to focus on oil and gas exploration and its U.S. retail business. In its first quarter earnings, announced in May 2013, the company said it continues to look for a buyer.
REFINERIES SAVED:
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, USA Capacity: 330,000 BPD Current Owner: Philadelphia Energy Solutions Former Owner: Sunoco Inc. Philadelphia Energy Solutions is the largest refinery on the U.S. East Coast and is a joint venture of Carlyle Group LP and Energy Transfer Partners, which bought its former owner, Sunoco.
Sunoco and Carlyle reached a deal in the summer of 2012 to keep the plant running with Carlyle overseeing daily operations while Sunoco retained a minority stake in return for its refinery assets. JPMorgan Chase & Co’s commodities division would supply the refinery with crude and non-crude feedstocks and purchase fuel produced by the plant for offtake.
Regional legislators, refinery unions and industry operators lobbied against the plant’s shutdown arguing that fuel shortages in the East Coast after the plant’s potential shutdown could create fuel shortages and hurt U.S. national security.
Mike Mergen/Bloomberg NewsSunoco Inc.’s Philadelphia Refinery stands on the banks of the Schuykill River in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
TRAINER REFINERY, PENNSYLVANIA, USA Capacity: 185,000 BPD Current Owner: Monroe Energy LLC, a subsidiary of Delta Air Lines FormerOwner: ConocoPhillips, which later spun off its refining and downstream arm Phillips 66 Delta bought the refinery from Conoco Phillips in spring of 2012 in order to control its jet fuel costs, which had reached $12 billion in 2011. The refinery has not yet become profitable But Delta said it expects the plant to turn a profit of $75 million to $100 million in the second quarter. It expects to use 50,000 bpd of cheap shale oil from the Bakken formation in North Dakota by the end of 2013.
Delta has a contract with BP Plc for crude supplies and former owner Phillips 66 to sell or swap products other than the jet fuel that the airline needs.
Jeff Topping/Getty Images
CRESSIER REFINERY, SWITZERLAND Capacity: 68,000 BPD Current Owner: Varo Energy Holding, a joint venture between Vitol and Marcel Van Poecke, co-founder of PetroPlus, and founder of AtlasInvest. Former Owner: Petroplus Vitol, the world’s largest oil trader, formed the joint venture to buy the refinery in June 2012, six months after Swiss-based Petroplus filed for insolvency. The refinery was fully operational by July that year.
ANTWERP REFINERY, BELGIUM Capacity: 107,500 bpd Current Owner: Gunvor, Swiss-based trading house Seller: PetroPlus Swiss-based trading firm Gunvor, co-owned by Russian tycoon Gennady Timchenko, bought the refinery in March 2012 from insolvent Petroplus to expand its infrastructure footprint in Europe’s largest oil trading hub. The purchase also provides Gunvor with “bricks and mortar” assets, giving it a reason to hedge exposure to physical markets ahead of stringent regulations on derivatives trading.
Jock Fistick/BloombergStorage tanks are seen at the Antwerp oil refinery.
INGOLSTADT REFINERY, GERMANY Capacity: 100,000 bpd Current Owner: Gunvor Former Owner: PetroPlus Gunvor bought the refinery from insolvent Petroplus in May 2012 and began operating the plant that August. The refinery had been in stand-by mode for seven months before the deal.
Repost from The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette [Editor: Someone with better statistician skills than me should verify this: take a look at NRDC’s Derailment Risk Zone Maps for California and do the math. For instance, the population of Sacramento at risk according to NRDC, (using 2010 figures) is 256,299. Divide that by the 2010 population of 466,488, and you find that 54.9% (!!) of Sacramento’s population is in the danger zone! Could this be right?- RS]
PublicSource: 40 percent of Pittsburgh, PA residents in danger zone for crude oil train derailment
By Natasha Khan / PublicSource, August 17, 2014
More than 40 percent of Pittsburgh’s residents live in areas at risk if a train carrying crude oil through the city derails and catches fire, according to a PublicSource analysis.
That number does not include children at 72 K-12 schools inside those areas.
PublicSource created a map using a perimeter of a half-mile on each side of the rail lines known to carry crude oil in the city. A half-mile is the federal evacuation zone recommended for accidents involving crude oil trains.
Pittsburgh’s Office of Emergency Management Services and Homeland Security began doing a risk assessment of the trains after the federal government ordered railroads in May to turn over information about which rail lines carry a million gallons or more of crude oil from North Dakota’s Bakken Shale at a time.
“Nobody really knows that there is an explosive bomb driving through their neighborhood,” said Bill Bartlett of Action United, a Pittsburgh group that advocates on behalf of low- and moderate-income families.
Dubbed “virtual pipelines,” these trains can carry millions of gallons of crude oil in more than 100 tank cars and can be a mile long. Many of them are on their way to Philadelphia refineries carrying increasingly large shipments of Bakken crude from North Dakota.
It’s difficult to know exactly how many trains come through Pittsburgh carrying crude oil because the two major railroads, Norfolk Southern and CSX, don’t identify their routes to the public for security and business reasons.
Crude-by-rail traffic has increased by more than 4,000 percent over the past five years. There have been at least 12 significant derailments involving crude oil in North America since May 2013. Lawmakers and public safety groups are concerned that residents near railroad tracks are exposed to more danger. And officials have said safety regulations aren’t keeping up.
The July 2013 accident in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, was the most devastating in years. A train carrying Bakken crude derailed and exploded, killing 47 people and destroying half the downtown.
And, since January, Pennsylvania has had three derailments involving crude. There were no injuries in any of the accidents.
While hazardous materials have traveled on railroads for years, trains have never carried this much crude oil, much of it Bakken crude, which is more flammable than other types of crude.
Emergency response in Pittsburgh
Raymond DeMichiei, deputy director of Pittsburgh’s office of emergency management and homeland security, said his office decided to do the emergency assessment after receiving information in June from the state that trains carrying more than a million gallons of crude were going through the city.
Mr. DeMichiei said his office didn’t have that information previously.
“We’ll determine if we have enough training, equipment,” Mr. DeMichiei said. “If we don’t have enough, we’ll get more.”
At least six states — Washington, North Dakota, California, Montana, Florida and Virginia — have made information publicly available about the amount of Bakken crude and the routes it is traveling.
Pennsylvania did not.
Mr. DeMichiei wouldn’t comment on how many crude trains come through the city daily, but said he generally sees a train along Route 28 on his way to work in the morning and then another one when he drives home.
“We are aware of the issues and we are working to make everyone as safe as possible,” he said.
Mr. DeMichiei said Pittsburgh doesn’t have a response plan specifically for Bakken crude and the railroads haven’t provided one. If an accident did occur, he said the city would base its response on U.S. Department of Transportation guidelines for accidents involving flammable liquids and establish a danger zone of a half-mile on either side of the track. That danger zone could expand depending on the scope of the accident, he said.
Emergency response officials in major cities and small towns have testified before Congress that responders wouldn’t be prepared to handle a large-scale crude oil disaster like the deadly one in Quebec.
Sixty-five percent of fire departments responsible for hazardous materials response haven’t trained all of their personnel for crude, a member of the International Association of Firefighters told Congress last month.
New York fire officials asked Congress to direct $100 million in emergency funds for a national training program for firefighters to address risks from these trains. The money would be used to train firefighters and to put in place stashes of firefighting foam and equipment, according to McClatchy Newspapers.
Alvin Henderson, chief of Allegheny County Emergency Services, said the rail industry has been very cooperative and first responders in the county are receiving training specific to crude oil.
Mr. Henderson said he’s not “losing any sleep” over crude oil moving through Pittsburgh.
A spokesman for Norfolk Southern said they’ll offer training in Pitcairn this month to first responders so they can get more hands-on experience with rail tank cars, equipment and information about crude oil shipments.
Under a recent voluntary agreement with the DOT, the rail industry committed $5 million for training first responders.
Pittsburgh Mayor Bill Peduto said that, in case of an accident, the city could call on the PA Region 13 Task Force. The task force is an initiative that allows counties to pull resources from the region in an emergency.
Trains rerouted in Missouri
Safety groups have urged railroads to reroute crude oil trains around populous areas.
In St. Louis, a city similar in population size to Pittsburgh, the fire chief and a group of residents said the Union Pacific Railroad has agreed to reroute crude oil trains around their neighborhood, and possibly the entire city.
“We stayed focused on the one issue: Get these trains away from people, get them away from the heart of the city,” said Tim Christian, a member of St. Louis for Safe Trains.
Residents of St. Louis’ Holly Hills neighborhood, where crude oil trains passed daily, held public meetings, lobbied experts and politicians and passed out pamphlets around St. Louis.
“We made just the right amount of noise through the right channels,” Mr. Christian said. “It was community in action and it worked well.”
St. Louis Fire Chief Dennis Jenkerson said he has a “gentlemen’s agreement” with the main railroad operator to reroute the trains around Holly Hills. There is no formal agreement, he said.
“I think they rerouted because of a concerned [citizens] group,” Mr. Jenkerson said.
Mr. Christian said he’s received more than a dozen phone calls from people across the U.S. asking how they can organize to reroute crude trains.
A few fearful and disorderly refinery employees and/or supporters have made verbal threats and ruined SafeBenicia signs, but opponents of the project don’t scare that easily. A transition away from fossil fuels will be fought with money, fear and every form of propaganda. Don’t listen. Solidarity with the workers is fine, but don’t buy into the threats that feed their fear and fury.
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