Mayors Call For Improved Safety Measures For Oil Trains
August 20, 2014
Firefighters douse a blaze after a freight train loaded with oil derailed in Lac Megantic in Canada’s Quebec province on July 6, 2013, sparking explosions that engulfed about 30 buildings in fire. More than 40 people were killed as a result of the crash and fire. (Photo redit: François Laplante-Delagrave/AFP/Getty Images)
CHICAGO (CBS) – Federal railroad officials got an earful Wednesday from the mayors of several Chicago area towns that have been affected by a growing number of increasingly long trains hauling crude oil and other volatile materials.
WBBM Newsradio’s John Cody reports the mayors expressed concerns about traffic congestion and public safety from freight trains that they said have been getting longer and more dangerous, due to larger amounts of flammable crude oil they haul in outdated tanker cars.
The mayors spoke directly to Federal Railroad Administrator Joe Szabo and Surface Transportation Board Chairman Dan Elliott III, at a meeting arranged by U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin.
The senator said approximately 25 percent of all freight train traffic travels through the Chicago area each day, including 40 trains hauling crude oil.
Barrington Village President Karen Darch said the village has seen a stark increase in the number of completely full freight trains hauling 100 or more carloads of crude oil or ethanol along the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway.
“Before, half of the community didn’t even know where the EJ&E Line was. There were a couple of trains at night. Now, several times a day, traffic – all traffic – comes to a halt as the train passes through town, and these can be hundred-car trains,” she said.
Darch and other Chicago area mayors said their constituents have been plagued by frequent traffic jams caused by long trains rolling through the area, and are constantly worried that a fire or worse could erupt on old tankers carrying volatile liquids.
They mayors expressed concerns about a repeat of a July 2013 freight train derailment in Quebec that killed 47 people and destroyed dozens of buildings when multiple tanker cars filled with crude oil caught fire and exploded.
Aurora Mayor Tom Weisner said safe passage is mandatory.
“About a third of the rail accidents that do occur are related to failures of the rail infrastructure itself, and so our position is basically twofold: one, improve the tank cars and get rid of the ones that aren’t safe; and second, make the rails safe.”
Durbin said the issue requires some time to address.
“I’ve talked to the tank car manufacturers, and they understand that they have two responsibilities: build a safer car, but in the meantime retrofit existing cars,” he said.
The senator said there is no way to immediately and completely ban older style oil tanker cars, but said federal railroad officials are aware of the danger they pose, and that they must be upgraded or replaced as soon as possible.
Darch urged federal authorities to institute increased safety controls and reduced speed limits for even small trains hauling crude oil.
“A huge concern for us is what about all the trains that come through that have 19 cars or less of hazmat,” she said.
Federal railroad officials said proposed federal regulations would require increased testing to keep crude oil out of older style tankers. Railroads also would be required to notify local officials when crude oil trains will roll through, and impose a 40 mph speed limit on such trains.
‘Weak safety culture’ faulted in fatal Quebec train derailment, fire
By Curtis Tate, McClatchy Washington Bureau, August 19, 2014
Aerial view of charred freight train in Lac-Megantic in Quebec, Canada. | TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA
CHICAGO — Canadian safety investigators on Tuesday blamed a “weak safety culture” and inadequate government oversight for a crude oil train derailment last year in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, that killed 47 people.
In its nearly 200-page report, issued more than 13 months after the deadly crash, Canada’s Transportation Safety Board identified 18 contributing factors.
“Take any one of them out of the equation,” said Wendy Tadros, the board’s chairman, “and the accident may not have happened.”
Among other factors, the investigation found that the train’s sole engineer failed to apply a sufficient number of handbrakes after parking the train on a descending grade several miles from Lac-Megantic, and leaving it unattended for the night.
The engineer applied handbrakes to the train’s five locomotives and two other cars, but investigators concluded that he did not set handbrakes on any of the train’s 72 tank cars loaded with 2 million gallons of Bakken crude oil.
Investigators said the engineer should have set at least 17 handbrakes. Instead, he relied on another braking system in the lead locomotive to hold the train in place. But after local residents reported a fire on the locomotive later that night, firefighters shut the locomotive off, following instructions given by another railroad employee.
Not long after, the train began its runaway descent, reaching a top speed of 65 mph. The train derailed in the center of Lac-Megantic at a point where the maximum allowable speed was 15 mph.
Investigators said that the derailment caused 59 of the 63 tank cars that derailed to puncture, releasing 1.6 million gallons of flammable crude oil into the town, much of which burned. In addition to the 47 fatalities, 2,000 people were evacuated, and 40 buildings and 53 vehicles were destroyed.
The train’s engineer and two other railroad employees are set to go on trial next month. But Tadros noted that the investigation revealed “more than handbrakes, or what the engineer did or didn’t do.”
“Experience has taught us that even the most well-trained and motivated employees make mistakes,” she said.
The Quebec derailment set in motion regulatory changes on both sides of the border to improve the safety of trains carrying crude oil. Sixteen major derailments involving either crude oil or ethanol have occurred since 2006, according to the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board.
Tadros said the railroad relied on its employees to follow the rules and that regulators relied on the railroads to enforce their own rules. But she said that a complex system requires more attention to safety.
“It’s not enough for a company to have a safety management system on paper,” she said. “It has to work.”
Report Reveals Cost Cutting Measures At Heart Of Lac-Megantic Oil Train Disaster
2014-08-19, by Justin Mikulka
Today the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released its final report on the July 6th, 2013 train derailment in Lac-Megantic, Quebec. The report produced a strong reaction from Keith Stewart, Greenpeace Canada’s Climate and Energy Campaign coordinator.
“This report is a searing indictment of Transport Canada’s failure to protect the public from a company that they knew was cutting corners on safety despite the fact that it was carrying increasing amounts of hazardous cargo. This lax approach to safety has allowed the unsafe transport of oil by rail to continue to grow even after the Lac Megantic disaster. It is time for the federal government to finally put community safety ahead of oil and rail company profits or we will see more tragedies, Stewart said.”
Throughout the report there is ample evidence to support Stewart’s position and plenty to show why the people of Lac-Megantic want the CEO of Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA), the rail company responsible for the accident, held accountable in place of the engineer and other low level employees currently facing charges.
At the press conference for the release of the report the TSB representatives often noted that they had found 18 factors that contributed to the actual crash and they were not willing to assign blame to anyone, claiming that wasn’t their role.
But several critical factors stand out and they are the result of MMA putting profits ahead of safety and Transport Canada (TC), the Canadian regulators responsible for overseeing rail safety, failing to do its job.
Engine Fire
The issue that set the whole chain of events into motion on July 6th was an engine fire in the unattended locomotive. As usual the engineer had left the train unattended with one locomotive running while shutting off the others. This locomotive supplied power to the air braking system. The locomotive caught on fire, the fire department was called and they put out the fire and shut off the locomotive in the process.
Today’s TSB report notes that the fire was due to an improper repair of a cam bearing. Instead of doing a costly replacement, the cam bearing was repaired with epoxy (polymeric material). As the report states:
This temporary repair had been performed using a polymeric material, which did not have the strength and durability required for this use.
Braking Failure
Once the locomotive was shut down due to the fire, it could no longer power the air brake system.
As previously reported on DeSmogBlog, this type of system has been described as “19th century technology” by a rail safety expert at the Federal Railroad Administration but as a whole the rail industry has not upgraded to newer technologies because of the costs involved.
Without power to the air braking system, the braking system lost pressure over time and the train began to roll towards Lac-Megantic.
This wouldn’t have been an issue if the proper number of handbrakes had been applied. But the engineer had not applied enough handbrakes because he had not performed the hand brake effectiveness test properly and had left the locomotive air brakes on while conducting the test. The report notes the lack of training and oversight for that particular locomotive engineer (LE).
Furthermore, the LE was never tested on the procedures for performing a hand brake effectiveness test, nor did the company’s Operational Tests and Inspections (OTIS) Program confirm that hand brake effectiveness tests were being conducted correctly.
The report also notes that when MMA employees were tested for safety knowledge, they could take the tests home.
Requalification typically consisted of 1 day to complete the exam, and did not always involve classroom training. On many occasions, employees would take the exam home for completion.
However, in this case, there were not even questions on the test on this critical subject.
They did not have questions on the hand brake effectiveness test, the conditions requiring application of more than the minimum number of hand brakes, nor the stipulation that air brakes cannot be relied upon to prevent an undesired movement.
And they found this had been the situation since before the oil trains starting running.
Since 2009, no employee had been tested on CROR 112(b), which targeted the hand brake effectiveness test. In 2012, U.S. employees had been tested twice on that rule; both tests had resulted in a “Failure”.
Single Operator Risks
The report goes into detail about how MMA came to be operating oil trains with only one crew member. And while ultimately the regulators failed, some did raise flags about this. When MMA initially sought to move to single person train operations (SPTO) from the standard two person crew, it was noted that there were significant issues with their operations.
In July 2009, TC expressed a number of concerns that centred on deficiencies in MMA operations, including lack of consultation with employees in doing risk assessments, problems managing equipment, problems with remote-control operations, issues with rules compliance, issues with fatigue management, and a lack of investment in infrastructure maintenance.
Additionally the report notes that Transport Canada’s Quebec office expressed specific concerns in 2010.
TC Quebec Region reiterated its concern about MMA’s suitability as an SPTO candidate.
And yet despite the concerns and MMA’s poor track record, in 2012 they were allowed to start running single crew trains despite TC Quebec still expressing concern.
In February 2012, TC met with MMA and the RAC. TC advised MMA that TC did not approve SPTO. MMA only needed to comply with all applicable rules and regulations. TC Quebec Region remained concerned about the safety of SPTO on MMA.
Unsurprisingly, the additional training for employees who would be operating trains on their own was almost non-existent. And it was focused on the fact that for safety purposes, engineers were allowed to stop the trains and take naps.
The actual SPTO training for several LEs, including the accident LE, consisted of a short briefing in a manager’s office on the need to report to the RTC every 30 minutes, on the allowance for power naps, and on the need to bring the train to a stop to write clearances.
This report is a clear indictment of a system that allows for corporate profit over public safety. However, what also is clear from today’s press conference and from the regulatory situation in the United States is that nothing of significance has changed regarding the movement of oil by rail in the US and Canada.
A poorly maintained locomotive can still be left running and unattended. There still is no formal regulation on how many hand brakes need to be applied to secure a train.
Single person crews are still allowed and Burlington Northern Santa Fe, the company moving the most oil-by-rail in the U.S., is working to implement this as a practice despite the objections of the employees.
In short, the corporate profit before public safety approach is still standard operating procedure. And the oil trains are expected to return to the tracks through Lac-Megantic within a year.
Train tracks where the ill-fated train was parked. (c) Justin Mikulka.
Image Credit: Transportation Safety Board via flickr.
Repost from The Financial Post, Toronto [NOTE: THIS POSTING OUT OF DATE, BUT THE ISSUES REMAIN SIGNIFICANT FOR US ALL! …FROM JUNE, 2013]
[Editor’s note: Here in Benicia, Valero is repeatedly using a scare tactic as one of its primary talking points. When Valero says that their Crude By Rail project will “ensure the refinery remains a strong and healthy member of the community” (quoting from Valero’s mailer), it plainly IMPLIES that without this project, Valero may NOT remain strong and healthy, nor a member of the community. Valero has in this way frightened their own employees about their job security, and they hope to scare the rest of Benicia about the possibility of a sell-off or closure, harming the local tax base and economy. A few fearful and disorderly refinery employees and/or supporters have made verbal threats and ruined SafeBenicia signs, but opponents of the project don’t scare that easily. A transition away from fossil fuels will be fought with money, fear and every form of propaganda. Don’t listen. Solidarity with the workers is fine, but don’t buy into the threats that feed their fear and fury.
The following article on “Atlantic Basin” refineries details 15 closures, 1 sale and 5 “saved” refineries over the last 5 years. Four of the closures were U.S. refineries, one in Canada. These closures and retrofits will be a growing phenomenon as we transition out of fossil fuels as a primary energy source. It will be tough on us all, but good for life on Earth. – RS]
Shut down, saved or sold: The Atlantic Basin refineries
Selam Gebrekidan, Reuters | June 21, 2013
Imperial Oil Dartmouth Refinery, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. | Imperial Oil Limited
Imperial Oil Ltd said earlier this week it was unable to find a buyer for its refinery in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, and will instead convert the facility into a terminal operation.
The refinery, which employs some 400 staff and contractors, is Imperial’s least-profitable operation, as it uses high-priced imported crude oil. The company’s other three refineries process cheaper Canadian crude.
Imperial, controlled by Exxon Mobil Corp, put the refinery up for sale more than a year ago and has had interested parties but was not able to make a deal.
The refinery, the only one in Nova Scotia, is among several on both sides of the Atlantic that operators have put up for sale, shut down, or threatened to close due to poor economics.
Below is a list of these refineries.
SHUT REFINERIES:
DARTMOUTH, NOVA SCOTIA, CANADA Owner: Imperial Oil Ltd Capacity: 88,000 BPD
Imperial said in June 2013 it was unable to find a buyer for its Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, refinery after putting it up on sale more than a year ago, and will instead convert the facility into a terminal operation. The refinery is Imperial’s least-profitable operation as it uses high-priced imported crude oil. Imperial is controlled by Exxon Mobil Corp.
PORT READING, NEW JERSEY, USA Owner: Hess Corp Capacity: 70,000 BPD
Hess shut down its Port Reading refinery at the end of February, 2013, the second such facility the company was forced to shutter over the last year, marking the company’s exit from the refining and terminal business.
ARUBA REFINERY, ARUBA Owner: Valero Energy Corp Capacity: 235,000 BPD
Valero decided to convert the refinery into a crude oil and refined products terminal in September 2012 after failing to find a buyer for the plant.
The refinery had been idled since March 2012 due to weak profit margins since it processes heavy sour crudes it bought at a higher cost. Chinese oil giant PetroChina was said to be among strong bidders for the refinery.
ST. CROIX, U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS Owner: Hovensa LLC, a joint-venture between Hess Corp and state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela Capacity: 350,000 BPD
Hovensa first reduced rates from 500,000 bpd and then shut the refinery in February 2012. The government of the U.S. Virgin Island objected to the shutdown and in April 2013 said it had agreed to a 14-month sales process with Hovensa LLC, during which time the company could use the plant as a terminal.
The refinery had been powered by fuel oil rather than cheap natural gas because its isolation in the Caribbean mean gas imports are not available. That fact contributed to Hovensa making a loss of $1.3 billion in the last three years of its operation and any future owner will have the same problem to contend with.
MARCUS HOOK, PENNSYLVANIA, USA Owner: Sunoco Inc, part of Energy Transfer Partners LP, Sunoco Logistics Partners LP, which is part owned by Energy Transfer Partners. Capacity: 178,000 BPD
Sunoco shut the refinery in Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania, in December 2011, due to excess capacity and poor margins. Sunoco Logistics then bought the refinery in April 2013 for $60 million and plans to turn it into a natural gas liquids hubs to take advantage of the nearby Marcellus and Utica shale plays.
The company received no offers for the plant as a refinery. Sunoco is processing natural gas at the plant.
YORKTOWN, VIRGINIA, USA Owner: Western Refining Capacity: 66,300 BPD
Western Refining shut the refinery in September 2010 because of poor refining margins. The site was subsequently sold to Plains All American in December 2011 and is currently in use as a terminal.
EAGLE POINT, NEW JERSEY Owner: Sunoco Inc, part of Energy Transfer Partners LP. Capacity:145,000 BPD
Sunoco shut the Eagle Point refinery in November 2009, the first of the casualties of weak demand and slim profit margins among Atlantic Basin refineries. The site, which is connected under the Delaware River to Sunoco’s other sites, Philadelphia and Marcus Hook (see above), is a terminal with capacity to receive barges of Bakken crude from Albany.
BERRE, FRANCE Owner: LyondellBasell Capacity: 105,000 BPD
In January 2012, LyondellBasell mothballed the refinery in southeastern France having been unable to find a buyer for the plant since it began a sales process in May 2011.
Anne-Christine Poujoulat/AFP/Getty ImagesAn employee of US chemical group LyondellBasell waves a French flag as the employees gather during a new general meeting to protest against the closing of their plant in Berre l’Etang, southern France, on September 29, 2011.
CORYTON, ESSEX, UNITED KINGDOM Owner: Petroplus Capacity: 175,000 bpd
A joint-venture of UK Ltd, Vopak and Greenergy bought the refinery from Petroplus and converted it into a terminal in June, 2012. The refinery had stopped processing crude in May last year after its estimated $1 billion price tag failed to attract buyers.
Matthew Lloyd/BloombergThe Petroplus refinery in Coryton, Essex.
TEESSIDE, UNITED KINGDOM Owner: Petroplus Capacity: 117,000 bpd
Petroplus idled the plant in April 2009.
PETIT-COURONNE REFINERY, NORMANDY, FRANCE Owner: PetroPlus Capacity: 161,000 bpd
Petroplus announced in April 2013 that it will shut the refinery after bids to buy it were rejected as unfeasible by the plant’s administrator.
REICHSTETT, FRANCE Owner: Petroplus Capacity: 85,000 bpd
Petroplus closed the refinery in eastern France in the second quarter of 2011. The least profitable of the plants in the PetroPlus refinery stable, the refinery was converted to become a terminal.
DUNKIRK, FRANCE Owner: Total SA Capacity: 150,000 BPD
A French court authorized oil major Total to permanently close the refinery in late October 2010 and proceed with plans to develop non-refining activities on the site.
WILHELMSHAVEN, GERMANY Owner: ConocoPhillips
Capacity: 260,000 bpd
ConocoPhillips put the simple, hydroskimming refinery up for sale in July 2010. It was bought a year later by private Dutch company Hestya. It is currently being used as a terminal.
CREMONA, ITALY Owner: Tamoil Capacity: 90,000 bpd
Libya’s Tamoil shut the Italian refinery at the end of March 2011 and said it would pursue plans to convert the plant to a storage site.
REFINERIES FOR SALE:
MILFORD HAVEN, UNITED KINGDOM Owner: Murphy Oil Capacity: 130,000 BPD
U.S. oil firm Murphy Oil Corp said it would sell the plant to focus on oil and gas exploration and its U.S. retail business. In its first quarter earnings, announced in May 2013, the company said it continues to look for a buyer.
REFINERIES SAVED:
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, USA Capacity: 330,000 BPD Current Owner: Philadelphia Energy Solutions Former Owner: Sunoco Inc. Philadelphia Energy Solutions is the largest refinery on the U.S. East Coast and is a joint venture of Carlyle Group LP and Energy Transfer Partners, which bought its former owner, Sunoco.
Sunoco and Carlyle reached a deal in the summer of 2012 to keep the plant running with Carlyle overseeing daily operations while Sunoco retained a minority stake in return for its refinery assets. JPMorgan Chase & Co’s commodities division would supply the refinery with crude and non-crude feedstocks and purchase fuel produced by the plant for offtake.
Regional legislators, refinery unions and industry operators lobbied against the plant’s shutdown arguing that fuel shortages in the East Coast after the plant’s potential shutdown could create fuel shortages and hurt U.S. national security.
Mike Mergen/Bloomberg NewsSunoco Inc.’s Philadelphia Refinery stands on the banks of the Schuykill River in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
TRAINER REFINERY, PENNSYLVANIA, USA Capacity: 185,000 BPD Current Owner: Monroe Energy LLC, a subsidiary of Delta Air Lines FormerOwner: ConocoPhillips, which later spun off its refining and downstream arm Phillips 66 Delta bought the refinery from Conoco Phillips in spring of 2012 in order to control its jet fuel costs, which had reached $12 billion in 2011. The refinery has not yet become profitable But Delta said it expects the plant to turn a profit of $75 million to $100 million in the second quarter. It expects to use 50,000 bpd of cheap shale oil from the Bakken formation in North Dakota by the end of 2013.
Delta has a contract with BP Plc for crude supplies and former owner Phillips 66 to sell or swap products other than the jet fuel that the airline needs.
Jeff Topping/Getty Images
CRESSIER REFINERY, SWITZERLAND Capacity: 68,000 BPD Current Owner: Varo Energy Holding, a joint venture between Vitol and Marcel Van Poecke, co-founder of PetroPlus, and founder of AtlasInvest. Former Owner: Petroplus Vitol, the world’s largest oil trader, formed the joint venture to buy the refinery in June 2012, six months after Swiss-based Petroplus filed for insolvency. The refinery was fully operational by July that year.
ANTWERP REFINERY, BELGIUM Capacity: 107,500 bpd Current Owner: Gunvor, Swiss-based trading house Seller: PetroPlus Swiss-based trading firm Gunvor, co-owned by Russian tycoon Gennady Timchenko, bought the refinery in March 2012 from insolvent Petroplus to expand its infrastructure footprint in Europe’s largest oil trading hub. The purchase also provides Gunvor with “bricks and mortar” assets, giving it a reason to hedge exposure to physical markets ahead of stringent regulations on derivatives trading.
Jock Fistick/BloombergStorage tanks are seen at the Antwerp oil refinery.
INGOLSTADT REFINERY, GERMANY Capacity: 100,000 bpd Current Owner: Gunvor Former Owner: PetroPlus Gunvor bought the refinery from insolvent Petroplus in May 2012 and began operating the plant that August. The refinery had been in stand-by mode for seven months before the deal.
A few fearful and disorderly refinery employees and/or supporters have made verbal threats and ruined SafeBenicia signs, but opponents of the project don’t scare that easily. A transition away from fossil fuels will be fought with money, fear and every form of propaganda. Don’t listen. Solidarity with the workers is fine, but don’t buy into the threats that feed their fear and fury.
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